“Where a document contains both legal and business advice, the primary purpose of the disclosure must be legal advice for solicitor-client privilege to apply to the document in its entirety. Privilege does not protect the entire document if the legal advice is only one purpose and not the primary purpose of the disclosure. However, we emphasize that while the primary purpose of the communication is business advice, solicitor-client privilege protects all parts of the document that contain legal advice. Second, the decision focuses narrowly on the categories of “legal advice” and “management advice”, to the exclusion of other types of non-legal communication between lawyer and client. Not all litigators are businesses, and not all non-legal advice provided by lawyers to clients relates to commercial matters. How, then, should Minnesota courts apply the overriding purpose test to mixed communications from individuals, non-profit organizations, or state litigants? Admittedly, the dominant purpose test is not intended as an investigative tool that can be used against companies, but not by companies against other litigants. The incorporation of section 274 (b) of the Judicial Code, 38 Stat. 956, into the Law and Equity Act 1915 allowed cases to be transferred to the other party of the court. The new procedure resolved legal issues arising from an equitable action without referring the case to the legal side.

This section also allowed fair defences to intervene in a claim before the courts. The same order was maintained as in the system of separate courts. Fair questions were settled first, and if a point of law remained, it could be heard by a jury. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935). See also Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922).

There was no provision for statutory counterclaims in an equitable action because rule 30 on equity, which required a response to a bill to disclose any claim arising out of the same transaction, was not intended to change the line between law and equity and was interpreted as applying only to equitable counterclaims. American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 360, 364 (1922); Stamey v. United States, 37 F.2d 188 (W.D. Wash. 1929). The equitable jurisdiction that existed at the time the bill was introduced was not disturbed by the availability of ex post facto remedies, and the timing was discretionary. American Life Ins. Co.

v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937). This difficulty was resolved by emphasizing the fundamental nature of the right to a jury trial and protecting it from reduction through the use of just principles. In Beacon Theatres v. Westover3, footnote359 U.S. 500 (1959). The General Court found that a district court had erred in itself examining all the issues in an action in which the plaintiff had sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting the defendant from bringing an antitrust action against him and that the defendant had brought a counterclaim for breach of antitrust law and a Claim for triple damages. The court found that it was irrelevant that the equitable claims were filed first and that the statutory counterclaims involved allegations common to the equitable claims. A subsequent jury trial on these matters would likely be precluded by collateral forfeiture, so that “the right to a jury trial on legal issues may be lost by a prior determination of equitable claims, only in the most compelling circumstances that we cannot foresee now given the flexible procedures of the federal rules.” 4 Footnote 359 U.S.

at 510–11. Then, in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 5 footnote369 U.S. 469 (1962). In which the plaintiff sought various types of remedies, including injunctive relief and settlement of monetary damages, the Court held that while the claim for relief was incidental to the equitable relief sought, the Seventh Amendment required that issues relating to that appeal be heard by a panel because the primary rights were decided were legal in nature. This has resulted in the rule that legal claims must be heard before just claims and before a jury if the litigant so wishes.6 FootnoteIf legal and equitable claims are joined and the court wrongly dismisses legal claims and decides common issues in the equitable action, The applicant cannot be prevented from rehearing these common issues in a jury trial. Lytle v Household Manufacturing, Inc., 494 U.S. 545 (1990). The use of the term “common law” in the amendment to refer to cases in which the right to a jury trial was to be preserved naturally reflected the division of the English and American legal systems into separate courts of law and equity, in which acts recognized by justice could generally be tried by a jury, while there was no fair right to a jury. In the federal court system, there were unified courts that had jurisdiction over both law and fairness, but different legal and fair procedures, including the use or non-use of the jury. With the adoption of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure in 1938, law and equity were merged into a single civil court and uniform rules of procedure were established.

Legal and equitable claims that previously had to be raised as separate pleas of different “parties” of the tribunal could now be joined in a single action and, in some cases, such as coercive counterclaims, they had to be joined in a single action.1 footnote 5 J.